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Abstract 
The purpose of this research paper is to determine whether aid can help to improve 
governance. In order to respond to this question, disaggregated aid had been used to measure 
the impact of aid on governance. 
Data from different sources (OECD, World Bank, African Development Bank...etc) covering 
41 Sub-Saharan African countries during the period 2006 to 2015 had been used. Our main 
variables are a composite to capture governance, Program aid, project aid, technical assistance 
disbursements, Conflict index, Press freedom index, constraint index..etc. 
Roughly, by using three econometric methods named pooled Ordinary Least Square, panel 
data random effect and Generalized Moment Methods (GMM) in order to check the 
robustness of our empirical model and to deal with endogeneity problem, we found some 
positive results. 
In fact, from our key econometric method (GMM, suggested by Arellano and Bond, (1991) 
We found both project aid and program aid have a diminishing marginal efficiency on 
governance but only project aid can help improving governance. The direct implication is 
increasing both project aid and program aid amount but focus more on project aid in case 
African Countries would engage in a process of improving their governance. 
The study shows also that, more dialogue between Government and opposition parties in 
order to implement reforms in the political system likely to improve Governance. In the same 
way, We found that more press entities are free and less conflict happened in these countries, 
more governance can be improved too. 
Building a prosperous nation, a nation where equality prevails vis-a-vis of the law among all 
citizen and other population living in the same Country, sometimes begins with insignificant 
but most important actions. People need to feel the effects of the different public policies that 
authorities implement. 
Therefore, the debate of aid impact on governance must not stop at the mere fact of 
amelioration of index. It should be evident by trying to built strong institutions, respect of law 
and order, equality of citizens vis-à-vis of the law, respect and protection of private initiative, 
respect for public procurement, etc... 
 
Keywords : Governance, project and program aid, Technical assistance, Generalized Moment 
Methods, Endogeneity, Sub-Saharan African Countries.  
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
I. Objectives of the study : 
This research paper will explore the relationship between foreign aid and governance in Sub-
Saharan African Countries. It will aim to show how foreign aid can improve governance by 
using an empirical study. Through this study, we will attempt to demonstrate that foreign aid 
can improve governance by improving economic policies, corruption, democracy and 
institutions, in particular in Sub-Saharan Countries. 
II. Statement of Problem : 
 The previous studies have shown that foreign aid flow has a negative effect on 
governance in developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan African Countries. 
 In fact, there is a passionate and controversial debate on the role of foreign aid in terms 
of economic growth and poverty alleviation but also in terms of improving governance in 
developing countries. For  Dalgaard and Hansen(2000) , "  the finding of a more positive 
impact of aid on growth in good policy environments is not a robust result (pg.18)" while 
World Bank, 1998, 2 and 4 reported that “Financial aid works in a good policy environment 
[and therefore] financial assistance must be targeted more effectively to low-income countries 
with sound economic management”. 
 In addition, let's mention that early 2000s, it was demonstrated that in developing countries 
with sound good economic policies and good institutions, there is a positive effect of foreign 
aid on economic growth  (Burnside and Dollar, 2000).  
 Burnside and Dollar (2004) suggest therefore the allocation of aid should be based  on 
or should be a systematic  function of the quality of institutions and policies. This is against 
the human rights of countries with bad policies and institutions. It is also against humanity 
and equity because institution or policy is in general inferior in poor or underdeveloped 
countries compared to higher, middle income, developing countries.  
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Many authors criticized Burnside and Dollar because of the fact that aid should be used to 
improve the policy and governance in developing countries ( Easterly et al, 2004; Dalgaard 
and Hansen, 2000)).  Critiques raised a proposal that aid flows could help developing 
countries to improve policies and institutions first and then aid flows to these countries would 
become effective in promoting growth and poverty reduction.  
 However, it is important to note that only a few studies had been done concerning aid 
flows impact on governance in developing Countries. Some of the recent studies, especially, 
based on a cross-sectional analysis concerning 32 African Countries, Bräutigam and Knack, 
2004, revealed that aid might be harmful for governance, even though they found a negative 
relationship between aid and governance. 
 For Busse and Gröning (2009), by using dynamic panel during the period 1984 to 2004, 
the notion that foreign aid can be considered to be harmful to the institutions of the beneficiary 
States. Recalls that Busse and Gröning (2009)used aggregated data on aid, from OECD website, 
and various indexes on the measurement of political institutions to re-examine the relationship 
between aid and governance. The results show a weak but positive effect of total aid on 
institutions.  
From these results, we can therefore assert that considering different types of aid according to 
their field and/or objectives, we note that this overall net effect of aid on governance remains 
mainly positive and attributable to its contribution to improving governance. It would therefore 
have been tempting to conclude that the data do not support the assertion that aid would have a 
systematic negative effect on institutions. 
Therefore, for Busse and Gröning (2009), taken in general or in aggregate amount, foreign aid 
flow to developing countries is not appreciated at its true value. It does not make it possible to 
apprehend its exact value in terms of the impact on governance in developing countries, especially 
in Sub-Saharan countries. One would be tempted to make the same observation in terms of 
economic policy implemented. This complexity can be explained by the fact that foreign aid flow 
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has many components with specific impacts or effects to be taken into account. The negative 
effect described as the causal link between development aid and governance should not lead to a 
reduction in the amount of financial aid to the developing country, especially in sub-Saharan 
Africa but find the way to make it more effective. 
 More recently, Biscaye et al  (2017)used data concerning OECD aid flow to assess  
bilateral and multilateral aid effectiveness on development and social outcomes. It has been 
found that there is no consistent evidence to determine whether multilateral aid is more 
effective than bilateral aid and vice versa in terms of improving governance 
III. Significance of the study  
 However, Burnside and Dollar (2000)indicate that aid cannot improve governance  or 
policy since reforms in governance and/or policy can be initiated only by socio-economic and 
political decisions of developing countries themselves. 
 So far, the net impact of aid on governance is not as much clear and perceptible 
despite the results of some existing studies in developing countries and in particular in Sub-
Saharan African countries showing that aid flows have a negative rather than a positive 
influence on governance. 
 In this current paper, we suggest to disaggregate foreign aid flow since depending on 
the types of aid, aid can improve policy or governance since for Burnside and Dollar 
(2004)and also Busse and Gröning (2009)support that countries with poor policy or institutions 
should be receiving technical assistance and demonstration projects aid. 
Furthermore, we will use a composite index combining ICRG for quality of Institution, level 
of democracy, Corruption and CPIA index for economic policy as a proxy for governance. 
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IV. Hypothesis 
 In this current research the hypothesis to be tested is the fact that depending on the 
types of aid, foreign aid flow can improve governance in Sub-Saharan countries. Based on 
Rugare and Lee, (2016)study, showing that program aid was more effective than project aid in 
promoting growth, We will disaggregate aid in terms of Program aid, project aid and 
Technical assistance. In other words, We will focussing on the findings of the main question 
about whether program aid also more effective than project aid in improving governance? 
Therefore in this research paper, we will disaggregate aid by type in our estimation model, 
instead of using the aggregated aid as an independent variable. Foreign aid will be 
disaggregated into program aid, project aid and technical assistance. 
V. Research Questions :  
 This research paper will attempt to respond the following questions : 1) How can each 
type of aid  interact with governance concerning its improvement ? 2) How are political 
constraints and press freedom are  likely to improve the accountability of the government ?  3) 
How should a higher level of education promote governance ? 4) How does Foreign Direct 
Investment can impact governance, since foreign investors might push for governance 
improvement ? 
VI. Methodology :  
 We will use roughly three econometric methods named pooled Ordinary Least Square, 
panel data fixed effect or random effect and Generalized Moment Methods (GMM) in order 
to take in to account the fact that each technique has his specificity (advantages and 
disadvantages). For instance,  panel data show cross sectional difference and also evolution of 
each country while GMM can help to deal with endogeneity problem. 
In addition, as we mention above, in this paper, foreign aid will be disaggregated by type 
(technical assistance, social sector aid, and infrastructure aid for each recipient country) 
instead of using the aggregated aid as an independent variable. The outcomes of the study 
 
5 
contribute to academic debate and also might be useful as a guideline by policy-makers in 
these countries towards effective reforms and operationalization of foreign aid. 
VII. Data sources 
Secondary literature and data available from OECD, World Bank, African Development Bank 
and United Nations specialized organisations website will be used. Our study is concerned 
with the period 2005-2015 through 30 Sub-Saharan countries in order to take into account the 
constraints of data availability from one variable to another one over the time. 
VIII. Structure of the research 
This current paper will be organised in four parts as follows :  
(i) Introductory chapter for the first part, (ii) Literature review for the chapter two, (iii) 
Chapter three is about the presentation of the methodology  and data description, (iv) The last 
chapter will be about the  major findings and policy implications/recommendations and limits 
of the study.  
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Chapter 2 : Literature review 
 In this chapter, we will review past literature based on the key findings and 
methodology used for the studies after which a chronological grouping will be done. 
It is worth mentioning that some studies had been conducted concerning the impact of aid on 
governance. In that sense, Qian (2014) claims that  "Foreign aid is one of the most important 
policy tools that rich countries use for helping poor countries to improve population well-
being and facilitate economic and institutional development (pg. 1). The empirical evidence 
on its benefits is mixed and has generated much controversy".  
So the debate about aid effectiveness, as have been earlier mentioned, has been discussed 
through some papers, public debate in developing countries as well in developed countries. 
These studies establish that there is a negative relationship between aid and governance. 
Consequently, some people argue that foreign aid to developing countries, especially the Sub-
Saharan countries, should be cancelled because of its is ineffective; others have equally 
argued that aid should be given, but with certain conditions. This assertion was the point of 
view of  Burnside and Dollar, (2000)when they claimed that "our results indicate that 
making aid more systematically conditional on the quality of policies would likely increase 
the impact on developing country growth ". 
According to World Bank (2015), the total amount of foreign aid to Sub-Saharan 
countries since the 1960’s is estimated around 568 billion USD, representing 15% of GDP of 
the continent. However, this aid has been fluctuating over time. It was less than 5% of GDP 
for all the countries for the first three decades after independency period (1960-1987), 
increased to reach peak points in 1994, and then decreased over the following five years. 
Since 2003 to date, however, the aid has shown an overall tendency of decreasing from 5.6% 
to 2.7%. 
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For some authors, aid is a developed country's domination instrument Hayter (1971), 
in her paper, "Aid as imperialism" that permits them to influence governments in developing 
countries in order to be exclusive users of many natural resources or to gain some market 
share in different fields. The same criticism is made about the fact that aid contributes to 
increase the number of civil servants in recipient's countries that make them inefficient. 
Furthermore this aid can be allocated to corrupt Government with lack of political and social 
Institutions. 
Through this financial flow some economic and social policies have been 
implemented with diverse and mitigating results essentially due to various reasons. As such, 
several scholars have published a lot concerning foreign aid effectiveness in terms of its 
impact on governance, for instance level of corruption, level of democracy, impact on 
development goals and targets ((Bräutigam and Knack, 2004); Busse and Gröning 2006; 
(Kersting and Kilby, 2013);; (Winters et al., 2015)). Similarly, a lot more queries are made 
along the issues of the conditions DAC members as well as the factors to be considered by 
multilateral agencies in aid allocation. 
 Most of the papers highlighted in this section, considered foreign aid flow and its 
negative relationship with governance. In this section, we will emphasize more on the 
publications as part of the assessment of the impact of development aid on at least one 
component of governance including corruption, the level of democracy, bureaucracy and 
institutions. Nonetheless, it should be remembered that aid in its design, and in its evolution 
as a source of development finance has been criticized for its effectiveness and impact on 
growth, the fight against poverty and more specifically, its effect on governance.  
From the 1970's to the 1990's, some economists have established a negative linear 
relationship between aid and economic growth  such as Griffin and Enos (1970); Boone 
(1994),  because of weak governance in these developing countries that culminated in the 
inappropriate use of aid in ways that were different from the intended purpose. In fact, a 
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critical look at official aid flow from these publications revealed that at that time, the main 
objective of aid was providing resources for poverty alleviation.  
A much different pattern has been presented since the early 2000’s. Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) have argued that in developing countries with sound good economic policies 
and good institutions, there is a positive effect of foreign aid on economic growth. We can 
notice that aid is effective under certain conditions such as good governance and with 
appropriate economic policies. So for Sub-Saharan African countries, governments should 
implement policies geared towards improving the quality of their institutions in terms of 
corruption perception and, simplifying the bureaucracy process.  
Corruption as it is well-known, is one of the prominent cankers confronting most 
developing countries, especially in the Africa region. According to Transparency 
International's Corruption Perception Index (2015), almost all countries in Sub-Sahara Africa 
are found in the endemic zone of corruption. This situation contributes to widening the 
inequalities between the different social strata and thus, deteriorating the standard of living of 
the populations with adverse effects of increased costs of living. 
Therefore, corruption, underpinned by poor governance coupled with bad business 
climate, is a hindrance to any development process so that countries with relatively high 
levels of corruption have very low growth rates and therefore have a negative impact on the 
fight against poverty, which is the main target of any development process.  
Bräutigam and Knack (2004)define improved governance as building a better 
bureaucracy in a country. This is reflected in the establishment and enforcement of laws, 
procedures and rules generally governing the life of a nation, which enable effective 
administration in its role as regulator and also in the provision of public services. In particular, 
the efficiency of public administration should also be reflected in the mobilization and growth 
of resources in a sustainable manner over time.  
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For them, governance improvement is not compatible with high-level flow of foreign aid in 
the sense that the process of mobilizing public resources through the budgeting of the state 
can be undermined. So receiving a huge amount of aid will not allow public services in charge 
of collecting taxes and others public resource to perform well. Their performance will be 
lower than what they can really do over the time. In that sense receiving aid can be considered 
as a negative actions for governance in terms of economic policy, especially public resources 
mobilisation. 
We can also mention that sometimes, for a particular project financed by resources from 
developed countries, most the activities are executed by a specialized agencies. For these 
agencies, everything can be free taxes or taxes exemptions.  
Because of the fact that, workers from these agencies or project teams have in some cases 
exemptions on their activity and also free consumption taxes as well as wages exemption 
taxes, it can result a reduction of the internal public resource mobilisation.  
We have another problem to mention concerning  the possibility for human resources in 
public sector to quit their job in favour of these specialized agencies due to high salary offered 
(problems of “poaching,”). Apparently,  Bräutigam and Knack (2004)had the same thinking in 
their words, saying that “Providing technical assistants who do not transfer skills but simply 
do the work themselves, or setting up bypass units, limits a central (or local) government’s 
ability to learn skills for more effectively managing and administering (pg. 261) ". This in turn 
leads to the inefficiency of the public administration due to the long hours  spent by civil 
servants and government officials, to supervise development projects financed by technical 
and financial partners. 
The aforementioned is part of the reason why some donor organizations such as US 
AID, GTZ and the World Bank use project teams to oversee and monitor the projects they 
finance in some countries in Africa, south of the Sahara such as Mali (OECD, 1984). This 
assertion is supported by Morss (1984), in a study financed by the financial and technical 
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partners' community. In that study, Morss claims that at the level of weak institutions in 
African states, the institutional impact of the aid can be significant, but absorption is fairly 
low. In his report, he uses the institutional "destruction" theme to designate recommendations 
that are not systematically followed or respected, with drastic reductions in the number of 
projects of more than half in countries affected by the economic crisis. 
On the other hand, Knack (2004), in his study on a set of recipient countries during the 
period 1975-2000 and titled "Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?", asserts that 
development assistance can lead to improved governance. This requires governments to 
implement various policies both in education and in the strengthening of the rule of law, with 
more freedom of expression, less constraint for the press and more transparency in electoral 
processes, etc. 
More specifically, it could be argued that Knack (2004)wants governments to 
implement the reforms to support the improvement of the illiteracy rate in developing 
countries. This could be done through adult literacy, but also, and above all, the schooling and 
education of children with local schools and the introduction of technical education in the 
context of the implementation of the overall policy from school. This will facilitate the 
process of injecting into the labour market, competent, high-quality human resources capable 
of stimulating the national economy. The case of South Korea is a concrete example worth 
emulating. In order to carry out these actions, aid has been argued to take the form of 
technical assistance. This technical assistance would therefore contribute to the capacity 
building of actors involved in the education system, electoral processes, legislation and 
justice, as well as compliance with laws and regulations. Moreover, Knack also suggests 
conditionality in aid allocation to perceive its positive effect on governance through 
democracy. 
For Rajan and Subramanian (2007), the basic argument of aid is that not all forms of 
aid are equal. This idea is to say that aid should not be considered in its entirety but rather 
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should be specified according to whether it takes the form of technical assistance or budget 
support. In this regard, many economists attempt to define or describe, and to identify aid that 
would enable development goals to be met. This is referred to as "good" or development-
oriented (pg. 325). Rajan and Subramanian (2007)suggest that technical assistance should 
focus on capacity building and institutions. 
The results of these estimates, which have a negative relationship between aid and 
governance, argue that considering aid as an aggregate global variable would be the 
explanation and therefore the "good" help or effective help is difficult to distinguish from 
others. 
For Busse and Gröning (2009), who define governance as "the selection and monitoring 
of governments and the effectiveness of a government in implementing policies" (pg. 76), consider 
that nations participating in international trade are inclined to improve their level of 
governance while those in conflict will see their level of governance deteriorate. This 
suggests, therefore, that the more a nation will participate in the global game of supply and 
demand, the more it is likely to improve its level of governance. The more this nation 
participates in the world trade, the greater the chances of respecting the rights of foreign 
investors, the more transparent it will be in these procedures of tender, arbitration, settlement 
of conflicts between investor or investor and public organizations, etc. 
Okada and Samreth (2012)using quantile regression approach, find that, in general, 
foreign aid tend to reduce the level of corruption. So the effect of foreign aid on Governance 
can be positive. In others words Governance can be improved in Countries receiving foreign 
aid. This paper  results show also that, the effect of aid is more important in Countries with 
low level of corruption. 
Kersting and  Kilby (2013)in their article have assessed the impact of aid on 
democracy using the Freedom House indicators. Based on the cross-sectional analysis, it 
appears that the long-term effect of aid on democracy in 122 countries between 1972 and 
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2011 shows a relatively stable significant and positive relationship after several robustness 
tests. 
In addition, an annual analysis of short-term panel data from 156 countries during tha 
period  19852011 examines the fact that whether aid operates or works under condition. In 
others words, it is about to analyzes if conditionality in giving aid to recipients countries is 
effective. Aid to recipient countries has or not a possible leverage effect.. The conclusion 
reached by the authors is the fact that (i) donors countries try to allocate their aid based on the 
political consideration in recipient countries. Recipient countries should in this case promote 
democracy  and (ii) beneficiary countries respond to this incentive for democratic reforms. 
This implies that, although donor countries allocate aid based on criteria such as the quality of 
institutions and the level of democracy, it is clear that aid also enables the beneficiary 
countries to act in the direction of improvement of their level of democracy. Moreover, the 
authors' method of identification rests on the fact that the allocation of aid is less conditioned 
by the level of democracy. In other words, democracy is less important as a criteria in the 
allocation of aid. What is really matter, is the geopolitical importance. 
Gibson, Hoffman, and Jablonski (2015), in their article "Did Aid Promote 
Democracy in Africa? The Role of Technical Assistance in Africa’s Transitions", 
questioned whether in the 1990s, foreign aid has hindered or catalyzed democratization in one 
of the continent (Africa) lagged behind when it comes to development , corruption issues, and 
other current problematic issues. ? 
To this question, they believe that after the Cold War donor countries tended to increase 
technical assistance in global aid programs allocation, improving recipient countries capacity 
to monitor effectively all the requirement in aid allocated use. Therefore, it is likely to avoid  
or reduce the capacity of non democratic leaders  to use  aid other way than its main purpose, 
in the way it had been planned. 
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Thus, for Gibson et al (2015), in order to hold themselves in power, certain leaders, autocrats 
have responded favourably to popular grumblings demanding the democratization of their 
society. These leaders therefore granted some basic political rights in favour to their 
opponents - from the legalization of opposition parties to organized elections. This has 
contributed in one way or another to the improvement of governance in these countries.  
It is important to note that Gibson et al (2015) tested their theory with panel data for all 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. One of the main conclusions is that while technical 
assistance contributes to explain the timing and extent of the democratization of Africa 
although other factors have played essential roles in the political liberalization of Africa. 
Recently, Reynolds et al. (2016)through forty publications examine the effectiveness 
of development aid flow. By comparing bilateral aid and multilateral aid, they come to the 
conclusion that there is no firm consensus on the effectiveness of one of the two types of aid. 
In certain cases multilateral aid is more effective than bilateral aid and vice versa. 
But what is important to remember at this level is the fact that, literature has 
highlighted some important publications which have long time claimed the effectiveness of 
multilateral aid (Rodrik, 1995; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Ram, 2003; Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2010) of the associated conditionality in order to reach the development 
objectives. All these arguments indicate that aid can be effective. That is why considering the 
disaggregation of that in studies could lead to better results. 
To reinforce our position of disaggregating aid, we will rely on the study conducted by 
Rugare and Lee (2016). According to this paper, program aid, which is also referred as budget 
support, is more effective in fostering economic growth unlike project aid even though it is 
important to note the decreasing marginal returns regarding economic growth. But, this 
program aid should be based on certain conditions. From this study, Rugarie and Lee (2016) 
show that aggregated aid is not significant and also that project aid negatively impacts 
economic growth.  
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Therefore, several studies on aid effectiveness in Sub-Saharan African countries 
consider aid as an aggregate measure integrating all forms of aid. Moreover, since sub-
Saharan Africa has benefit of a fairly substantial proportion of project aid, the results of some 
studies showing the ineffectiveness of the aid, seem logic. 
Based on what we learnt from previous studies, this current paper will use panel data 
fixed effect in order to take in to account the fact that it is more balanced as method. In fact 
panel data show cross sectional difference and also evolution of each country. We will use aid 
data from OECD website from 2006 to 2015 based on DAC members effective 
disbursements. This choice is different from others such as Cordella and Dell’Ariccia (2003), 
and Ouattara and Strobl (2004) where for their studies, they used estimation concerning aid 
flow. Using effective disbursements, will permit to avoid an eventual estimation bias. 
In addition, our variable of interest, aid, will be disaggregated into program aid,project 
aid and technical assistance for each recipient country to assess how foreign official aid flow 
can improve governance. 
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Chapter 3 : Methodology and data 
description 
In this chapter, We will attempt to evaluate how aid can significantly influence or impact 
governance by using 03 econometric techniques : Pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS), panel 
data method (Fixed Effect or Random Effect), where Hausman test for model specification 
will help us to choose whether fixed effect or random effect should be used and Dynamic 
panel called Generalized Moments of Method.  
Our choice for these three econometrics techniques is to check or confirm the robustness and 
consistency of the findings from this current study.. While it is clear that the ordinary least 
squares regression would be criticized for its ability to give biased results (due to the fact that 
the specificities of the different countries are not taken into account), it is certain that there are 
advantages and disadvantages credits to panel data estimates. 
One could simply mention the fact that the adjustment of heterogeneity or the problem of 
collinearity.  
They can also help with the problem of heteroskedasticity. It should be noted that fixed effect 
and random effect are better techniques compared to ordinary least squares under certain 
conditions, namely the strict exogeneity of the explanatory variables. 
For static panel data method, the Hausman test is necessary in order to make a difference 
between panel data fixed effect and  random effect in the sense that both, under the null 
hypothesis due to higher efficiency, random effects should be preferred, while fixed effects 
would be at least consistent and thus preferred under the alternative hypothesis. 
Thus, if the hausman test does not lead to reject null hypothesis , the Random Effect method 
will be preferred, and fixed Effect method in the contrary case (Hausman, 1978; Wooldridge, 
2012). 
 
16 
In order to solve the problem of potential endogeneity and other potential problems, we 
propose to use the method of panel dynamics as the third and key/main econometric technique 
which is also called the Generalized Moment Method (GMM). 
We can also notice that this technique which gives robust estimators was proposed for the first 
time by Arellano and Bond (1991). Busse and Gröning (2009) have used it in their study of 
Governance in sub-Saharan Africa, and has proved to be very popular among 
macroeconomists in recent years. 
This study cover the period 2006 to 2015 and data had been collecting from OECD Website 
for aid (Program aid, project aid, technical assistance) disbursements, World Bank website for 
Economic growth, Foreign Direct investment, Trade, Primary School Enrolment and Conflict 
index. Press freedom index comes from "Freedom House" website while Political constraint 
index is from Wharton University of Pennsylvania (Henisz, 2015). 
I. Methodology  
1. Model specification and analysis :  
To assess the relationship between aid and governance, the following  model is used  : 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑑_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑖𝑑_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑖𝑑_𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑖𝑑_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗2𝑖𝑡+𝐴𝑖𝑑_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔2𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑖𝑑_𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ2𝑖𝑡 +
𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝐸𝑛𝑟_𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠_𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝑃𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Where i represents Countries and, t the Years,  
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 : is composite index of governance, 
𝐴𝑖𝑑_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑖𝑡 : Project aid disbursements from OECD Countries as percentage of GDP, 
𝐴𝑖𝑑_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 ∶ Program aid disbursements from OECD Countries as percentage of GDP, 
𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 ∶ Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth,  
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡: Foreign Direct Investment, as % of GDP 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡: Total Export and Import as percentage of GDP, 
𝐸𝑛𝑟_𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 : Primary Enrollement, 
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𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠_𝐹𝑖𝑡 : Press freedom index, 
𝑃𝑜𝑙_𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 : Political constraint, 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 : Conflict index (from International Country Risk Guide data), 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 : error term. 
2. Data description   
First of all, it is important to note that in this current, data from different sources covering 41 
countries1 during the period 2006 to 2015 will be used. Also, as we mentioned earlier in this 
current paper,  aid will not be used as a whole amount but we propose to disaggregate it in 
program aid, project aid, technical assistance. This proposition about disaggregation of aid is 
based on empirical studies saying that depending on the types of aid, aid can improve policy 
or governance since for Burnside and Dollar (2004) and also Busse and Gröning (2009) support 
that countries with poor policy or institutions should be receiving technical assistance and 
demonstration projects aid. 
Finally, for the composite index of governance, ICRG for Country risk and CPIA from World 
Bank had been used to consider both side Institution and economic policy. So that, for ICRG 
we will consider Democracy, Corruption, Bureaucracy, law and order subcomponent while 
for CPIA, it will be about Economic management, policies for social inclusion and structural 
policies. 
It is important to note that, except different types of aid included in our model, we used some 
others control variables because of the fact that, they have their impact on Governance as 
mention by the literature review. 
The following table below show a summary of all the variable concerning their sources, the 
scale and their interpretation :  
                                                            
1
 Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Dem. Rep., 
Congo Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Soudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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Table  1 : Description and source of variables of interest 
N° Variables Description Source 
1.  Gov 
Composite index from ICRG and CPIA data. 
Ranking from 1 to 6 and getting better with 
high score 
World Data Index, 2016 
and Country risk Index 
(PRS group) 
2.  Aid_Prog Program Aid disbursements in % of GDP 
OECD Creditor Reporting 
System 
3.  Aid_Proj Project Aid disbursements in % of GDP 
OECD Creditor Reporting 
System 
4.  Aid_Tech 
Technical assistance disbursements in % of 
GDP 
OECD Creditor Reporting 
System 
5.  GDP_growth Real Economic growth  World Data Index, 2016 
6.  FDI Foreign Direct investment as % of GDP World Data Index, 2016 
7.  Trade Total Export and Import as % of GDP World Data Index, 2016 
8.  Enr_Prim Primary Enrolment rate World Data Index, 2016 
9.  Press_F 
Press freedom Index. Using rating score from 1 to 
7 where rating score as 1  means most free while  
7 means least free 
Freedom House, 2016 
10.  Pol_const 
Political constraint index challenges facing by 
political leaders in the process of changing a status 
quo policy in their country withina given year.  
Ranking from 0 to 1, so that a value close to zero 
is less constrained thus bad while close to 1 means 
good. 
Governance Assessment 
Portal (Henisz, University 
of Pennsylvania) 
11.  Conflict 
Index of Country Risk and Governance : 
internal conflict component measuring 
political violence. Ranking from 1 to 12 and 
getting better (low risk) with high score. 
Country risk Index (PRS 
group) 
Source : World Bank/OECD/ Freedom House/PRS Group/University of Pennsylvania 
II. Descriptive analysis 
Our variables of interest and some important control variables listed in the table below show 
that for each variables, the number of observations is more than 256 that is appreciable for the 
sample size. 
Table  2 : Descriptive statistics table 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gov 420 2.863348 .612401 .625 4.211 
Aid_Prog 450 10.18676 21.60267 0 323.7444 
Aid_Proj 450 5.183464 6.337436 0 62.363 
Aid_Tech 450 .0016106 .0025332 0 .02384 
GDP_growth 450 4.615844 4.587027 -36.7 22.59 
FDI 438 5.499838 7.901398 -5.978 84.946 
Trade 412 76.12992 35.48296 19.101 321.632 
Enr_Prim 256 74.92286 16.38053 35.094 99.214 
Press_F 450 4.31 1.645 1 7 
Pol_const 430 .259793 .193005 0 .709 
Conflict 320 7.645816 1.766045 4 10.667 
Source : Our calculation on Stata 
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On average, our dependant variable value during the period 2006-2015 is around of 2.86 with 
a standard deviation 0.61. The variation range is about 0.63 to 4.21. So We can easily so that, 
on average the level of Governance is lower. 
For the different type of aid, on average Sub-Saharan Countries during the period 2005 to 
2016 received respectively 10.19%, 5.18% and 0.0016% of GDP in terms of Program aid, 
project aid and technical assistance. 
Concerning the control variables in assessing press freedom, political constraint, conflict we 
note that the situation is not too bad, especially for press freedom and internal conflict with 
respective average around 4.31 (1.645 as standard deviation) and 7.65 (1.766 as standard 
deviation). 
So that, the overall situation relative to governance in terms of democracy, corruption, quality 
of institution as well as economic policy...etc. is "non-tiring" as a situation even if some 
countries such as Kenya, Ghana and a little less Senegal stood out. 
On the other hand, economic growth point out on average around 4.62%, more than growth in 
OECD countries (1.37%2) and also the world economic growth at that time (2.68%3) while 
Foreign Direct Investment was low, on average around 5.5%.  
Graphically, we can attempt to check the relationship sign between some majors variable and 
our composite index of governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source :  Our calculation on Stata 
                                                            
2 World bank data, 2016 
3 World bank data, 2016 
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Figure 1 : Scattter plot showing relationship between Governance, freedom index, political 
constraint and Conflict index 
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As we can see in figure 1, our composite index of governance has a positive relationship with 
Conflict Index and political Index while this relationship is clearly negative considering 
Freedom index. 
This descriptive analysis fits with the definition of these index stat showing that, in one hand, 
as political constraint index getting better (Opposition party can lead for change in election 
process...etc) as well as Conflict index, governance should be improved. In others words 
Governance should be improved with better climate related to conflict and political constraint. 
On the other hand, degradation of press freedom index (value more close to 1) can lead to bad 
governance. Therefore, freedom should be guaranteed for Press and other political and NGO 
media operating in this field of interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source :  Our calculation on Stata 
Apparently, program aid, project aid, Technical assistance and primary school enrolment rate 
all have positive relationship with our dependant variable Which could reflect the fact that 
improving these index can lead to improve governance index. 
But unfortunately, these relationships cannot be more deeply discuss without any regression 
results. So in order to have the real impact of the different types of aid as well as some control 
variables such as conflict, press freedom, etc. we will analyse it in the following chapter 
named findings and discussion. 
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Figure 2 : Scattter plot showing relationship between Governance, program aid, project aid, 
technical assistance and primary school enrolment rate 
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Chapter 4 : Main findings and 
discussions 
In this study, as earlier mentioned, panel data analysis was used to assess the effect of Aid on 
governance. So, Hausman test for model specification was conducted in order to check 
whether our choice should be based on  fixed effect model or random effect model. The 
results, as detailed in table 3 below, shows that the random effect model is preferred to the 
fixed effect model. 
In fact, "p. value" (Prob>chi2) is equal to 0.9399 that is greater than 5%. We cannot reject the 
null hypothesis (difference in coefficient not systematic). Therefore, the random effect model 
was used for modelling the relationship between aid and governance. 
Table  3 : Hausman test for model specification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source :  Our calculation on Stata  
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.9399
                          =        0.79
                  chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
    Conflict       .055498     .0565464       -.0010484        .0268352
   Pol_const      .2219627     .1998288        .0221339        .0190649
     Press_F     -.0746659    -.0904019         .015736        .0054913
    Enr_Prim      .0003962     .0017641       -.0013678        .0007142
       Trade     -.0007397    -.0011205        .0003808        .0002607
         FDI      .0012537      .001229        .0000246               .
  GDP_growth       .002348     .0027011       -.0003531               .
   Aid_Tech2     -699.9871    -618.5746       -81.41242               .
   Aid_Prog2     -7.18e-06    -7.70e-06        5.19e-07               .
   Aid_Proj2     -.0001266    -.0001549        .0000283               .
    Aid_Tech      9.980144     7.993337        1.986807               .
    Aid_Prog      .0019814     .0021714         -.00019               .
    Aid_Proj       .007378     .0084875       -.0011095               .
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
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The regression results shows that Project aid, Program aid and also project aid square 
significant at 5% for random effect while program aid square is significant at 10%. 
We can also note that, some control variables such as Press freedom and conflict are 
significant at 10% while political constraint is significant at 5%. 
Unfortunately, Trade variable show a significant coefficient but negative. Additionally, 
Primary enrolment and Foreign Direct Investment, are not significant in random effect 
regression as well as the fixed effect regression. 
Table  4 : Regression results (OLS, FE and RE) 
 (OLS) (RE) (GMM1) (GMM2) 
VARIABLES Gov Gov Gov Gov 
     
Aid_Proj 0.0236*** 0.00849** 0.00261** 0.00353*** 
 (0.00652) (0.00421) (0.00108) (0.00115) 
Aid_Prog 0.00306* 0.00217** -4.88e-05 -0.000121 
 (0.00156) (0.000878) (0.000170) (0.000105) 
Aid_Tech -23.37 7.993 -2.538 -2.359 
 (14.59) (8.993) (2.082) (1.839) 
Aid_Proj2 -0.000292*** -0.000155**   
 (0.000105) (6.55e-05)   
Aid_Prog2 -9.84e-06* -7.70e-06***   
 (5.10e-06) (2.82e-06)   
Aid_Tech2 687.6 -618.6   
 (670.6) (394.5)   
GDP_growth 0.00643 0.00270 0.00111 -0.00107 
 (0.00393) (0.00216) (0.00149) (0.00153) 
FDI 0.000235 0.00123 -0.000812 -0.000590 
 (0.00208) (0.00116) (0.00216) (0.00202) 
Trade -0.00237*** -0.00112** -0.000250 -0.000189 
 (0.000486) (0.000508) (0.000445) (0.000563) 
Enr_Prim 0.00746*** 0.00176 -0.00312 -0.00368 
 (0.00112) (0.00134) (0.00224) (0.00266) 
Press_F -0.172*** -0.0904*** -0.0662*** -0.0547*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0146) (0.0217) (0.0212) 
Pol_const -0.0974 0.200** 0.328*** 0.346*** 
 (0.105) (0.0871) (0.0664) (0.0612) 
Conflict 0.0236** 0.0565*** 0.0687* 0.122*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0211) (0.0395) (0.0341) 
L.Gov   0.245* 0.307*** 
   (0.134) (0.104) 
L2.Gov    -0.220** 
    (0.106) 
Constant 2.942*** 2.636*** 2.098*** 2.140*** 
 (0.142) (0.232) (0.491) (0.421) 
     
R-squared 0.757    
Number of Country  42 42 42 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Roughly, all of the econometric techniques (pooled OLS, RE and GMM) used in this paper 
show that project aid and program aid are somehow significant at deferent level in contrary to 
Technical aid which is not significant for any of the regressions.  
As such, it can be noticed that program aid is just significant with pooled OLS and RE 
regression at 1% and 5% respectively It shows a positive relation in terms of change 
concerning governance index. Base on pooled OLS and RE results, we can say that improving 
Program aid by 10% will help to improve Governance index respectively by 3.06% and 2%. 
Similarly, project aid is significant with pooled OLS, RE and GMM regressions. These three 
regression results show that project aid is significant at 10% , 1% and 5%. respectively Pooled 
OLS results have higher coefficient (maybe because of the bias problem due to endogeneity). 
RE and GMM result show weak but positive coefficients (0.00849 and 0.00261). This implies 
that both project aid and program aid can lead somehow to improve governance. 
In accordance with the random effect regression results, "Ceteris paribus" when we increase 
the amount of project aid by 10% unit, on average, governance index will increase by 8.49%. 
This effect is around 3% to 3.5 % once we increase project aid by 10%using GMM technique. 
Therefore, it can be said that project aid has a positive and significant effect on improving 
governance in Sub-Saharan African Countries. But this effect of project aid on governance 
can be biased due to endogeneity problems because we suspect at least reverse causality 
between Aid and governance using pooled OLS and RE regression results. This is the main 
reason to consider the effect using GMM technique. 
The same interpretation can be made concerning the program aid effect on the improvement 
of governance index. At this level, the effect is less pronounced. The impact of program aid 
on governance is 3.06% and  2.17% as program aid increases by 10% as show in the pooled 
OLS and RE regression results table. 
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Unlike some authors such as Griffen and Enos 1970; Boone, 1994 who argued that aid had a 
negative influence on governance, the results obtained in this study clearly show that aid can 
be a factor in improving governance. 
In our study, we considered aid in three different ways: project aid, program aid and technical 
assistance. From these three types of aid, the results of our regression show a positive and 
significant relationship between project aid and program aid at 5% significance. This 
relationship confirms the suspicions of Bräutigam and Knack (2004), which revealed that a 
negative relationship between aid and governance is possible.Indeed, for Bräutigam and 
Knack (2004), under certain/others conditions, aid could be effective regarding governance. 
These results, however, confirm the arguments or even the assertions of Okada and Samreth 
(2011) using quantile regression approach in their study, where they found that, in general, 
foreign aid tends to reduce the level of corruption. So the effect of foreign aid on governance 
can be positive. In other words governance can be improved in countries receiving foreign 
aid. 
However, the data from our study through the regression results does not give a significant 
relationship for technical assistance. This result leads to an unclear position on the impact  of 
tchnical assistance on governance, unlike Gibson et al (2015), in their article "Did Aid 
Promote Democracy in Africa"? The Role of Technical Assistance in Africa’s Transitions". 
Considering that, technical assistance has an important role to play in the process of 
democratization and therefore of improving governance. 
The direct consequence of these changes would be a direct and positive implication on 
eventually building strong institution, improving economic policies and also increasing 
investment flow which can eventuqlly lead to better economic growth and poverty alleviation. 
Relatively to project aid square and program aid square, it might be noted that the negative 
coefficients implies their decreasing marginal efficiency on governance. This means that an 
increase in aid (both project aid and program aid) would tend to positively influence 
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governance index, but not indefinitely. This positive influence will increase to a certain level 
before beginning to decline gradually. It is therefore important to see aid in this case as a tool 
to accompany the development process through improving governance at the level of the 
Sub- Saharan African Countries. 
In addition to our variables of interest, we also have control variables which for some are 
significant and are consistent with empirical evidence (press freedom, conflict and political 
constraints) and for others not significant or significant but giving opposite results to 
empirical studies.  
Concerning variables such as press freedom and conflict, they are respectively significant at 
least at 10% for all the techniques with different a marginal effect regarding the improvement 
of the governance index. Depending on the technique, press freedom has a marginal impact 
from around 5% to 17%. Thus, an improvement of these indices necessarily leads, according 
to the results of our analysis, to an improvement of the governance index. For instance, GMM 
shows that improving press freedom by 1% will improve governance index by 5% to 6.6% 
while pooled OLS and RE predict respectively 17% and 9%.  
Also, the same objective can be obtained by trying to improve conflict index. Let's recall that 
conflict index is from Index of Country Risk and Governance : internal conflict component 
measuring political violence. It is ranked from 1 to 12 and getting better (low risk) with high 
score. Here, improving this index by 1% will improve Governance by 2.36% (pooled OLS) 
5.65% (RE) or 6.87% to 12.2% (GMM). 
On the other hand the political constraint variable is also significant at 5% and 10% using the 
RE and GMM,  with a marginal effect of 20.0% and 3.28% to 3.46%. 
In view of the results of our analysis, the problematic variable would be trade insofar as the 
expected sign of the coefficient should in principle be positive because, as demonstrated by 
Busse and Gröning (2009), consider that nations participating in international trade are 
inclined to improve their level of governance. In other words, the more a nation will 
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participate in the global game of supply and demand, the more it is likely to improve its level 
of governance. The more this nation participates in the world trade, the greater the chances of 
respecting the rights of foreign investors, the more transparent it will be in these procedures of 
tender, arbitration, settlement of conflicts between investor or investor and public 
organizations, etc. But it is clear that, we have results that are opposed to this argumentation 
seems logical. Recall that this variable (Trade) is negatively significant at the 5% (RE) and 
10% (pooled OLS) threshold with a marginal effect of -1.12% and 2.37% on Governance 
index as trade increases by 10%. 
Finally, We can also mention the fact that lagged dependents variable are statistically 
significant using GMM estimators. The interpretation of this results suggest the importance of 
the past value of Governance on the current one.This results are valid as confirm by the test 
for autocorrelation4 mention by Arellano and Bond (1991). The interpretation of the validity 
of the GMM estimators indicates that there should be no serial correlation for idiosyncratic 
errors. Because of the fact that, the first-order difference of error terms is necessarily 
autocorrelated, it would therefore be enough to focus on the second autocorrelation.  
Thus, in view of the autocorrelation results given in Table 7 in the appendix, it can be said 
that there is no serial correlation. The value of the second-order (pvalue =0.2534) 
autocorrelation test corresponds to that reported in Arellano and Bond (1991) and presents no 
evidence of model misspecification.  
                                                            
4 See Table 7 in annexe 
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Chapter 5 : Conclusion and policy 
recommendation  
The debate between generations of economists on the impact of aid on governance dates back 
several years. Recent studies show that aid has a negative effect on governance, although 
some authors have attempted to demonstrate the opposite. 
Based on Burnside and Dollar 2000 and some other main studies, this paper had as purpose to 
find out if aid has a significant impact on governance by using random effect Panel data 
related to 42 Sub-Saharan African Countries through composite governance index 
characterized or measured by ICRG index components (democracy, corruption, bureaucracy, 
law and order) and CPIA index components (Economic management, polices for social 
inclusion, structural policies). 
I. Summary of the study et policy recommendations 
In terms of governance, the regression results have shown that project aid and program aid 
have both positive and significant effect on governance index while technical assistance is not 
but has positive and much higher coefficient. However project aid would have a better 
efficiency because of the fact that its marginal effect is much higher than program aid effect. 
In that case, the purpose of improving governance in these countries should be done through 
more project aid than program  aid. 
In this current empirical analysis, by using Dynamic Panel estimators called also the General 
Method of Moment (GMM), we solve the possibility of endogeneity, unobserved 
heterogeneity and simultaneity bias of aid on governance. In fact, GMM is the econometrics 
method suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) which uses instrumental variable approach  to 
deal with estimation bias due to reverse causality, omitted variable and also measurement 
error. Therefore, in this paper, GMM has been used to assess the impact of Aid (project aid, 
program aid and technical assistance) on governance without bias issue.  
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Our results show that both project aid and program aid have a diminishing marginal efficiency 
on governance. The direct implication is increasing both project aid and program aid amount 
but focusing more on project aid in case Sub-Saharan African Countries would engage in the 
process of improving their governance. The current results show that project aid would tend to 
positively influence governance index, but not indefinitely. This positive influence will 
increase to a certain level before beginning to decline gradually. That means, by using project 
aid, governance can be improved. 
Also, the study shows that, more dialogue between government and opposition parties in 
order to implement reforms in the political system likely to improve Governance . In the same 
way, we found that when more press entities are free and less conflict happened in these 
countries, more governance can be improved too. 
These findings are in line with recent recommendations about official aid to developing 
countries which suggest that more aid should be allocated to poor countries and aid in this 
case is more effective by creating better institutions, improve economic policies and therefore 
more wealth through economic growth. Therefore the main actions or policy implications we 
can suggest are : 
 Increase the net official development aid and settle for Governance improvement in 
order to support reforms which will have as purpose to help building strong 
Institutions, democratic and less corrupted society in development countries ; 
The general observation is that in Africa, many countries have not strong institutions 
mainly in the case of the institutions of justice, the institutions responsible for 
legislating ... etc. whereas the fundamental rule of functioning of a State suggests that 
the three main powers such as the executive power , the legislative power and the 
judiciary power are independent.  
With the exception of some few developing countries in general, and especially in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, make the effort to combat such scourges as corruption, impunity, 
 
29 
establishment of zero tolerance or even to set up an effective administration ... etc. It is 
supposed that the independence between these three powers, mentioned above is not a 
reality. For example, in some countries, there is often a perception of widespread 
impunity for proponents of the executive branch or some senior 
administration/Government officials, often involved in financial scandals or issues, 
nepotism and other problems in their function. These various acts are naturally likely 
to contribute to create a general climate of non-compliance with laws, regulations and 
other legal provisions. It is also noted that these acts are likely to negatively impact the 
economy. So, it is highly important to implement policies to contain or reduce them at 
the neglected level. 
 Also, in order to build a strong productive system, and a competitive economy, aid 
should be used partially to ameliorate the overall rank of Sub-Saharan African 
Countries in the World Bank's Doing Business ranking. This will attract Foreign 
Direct Investment ; 
Some studies show that, at macroeconomic and microeconomic level, corruption has 
deleterious effects on per capita GDP, growth (Mauro, 1995; Ades and Tella, 1997; 
Lambsdorff, 2003) and lead to a declining in efficiency in terms of allocation and use 
of production's factors (Dal Bó and Rossi, 2007). Several explanations on the links 
between corruption and growth could be mentioned. Obviously, corruption would be a 
brake on growth and therefore on domestic investment and in fact, the attraction of 
foreign investment. It discourages private investment because it increases indirect 
costs of production (corruption acts as a "tax" on investment) as well as uncertainty 
about the return on investment to come. 
In addition, corruption negatively affects the volume of public productive investment 
by diverting these public funds to unproductive ventures. Corruption has a negative 
effects on the efficiency of public investment since corrupted civil servants give 
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priority to projects that serve their own interest to the detriment of projects that have 
important social benefits. 
It should be noted that some economists have demonstrated, as mentioned earlier in 
this study, that open economies are likely to encourage foreign investment because 
opening up a country to trade is expressed through the gradual simplification of 
procedures , controls and restrictions that oppose free trade. The orientation of exports 
can also be considered as a determinant of FDI because of the high propensity of 
exports by foreign firms (Ewe-Ghee Lim, 2001). In this regard, Stein et al. (2003), 
Jaumotte (2004), Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) and Neumayer and Spess (2005) 
tested the impact of the openness factor on FDI flows and found it to be a determinant 
important. Thus, it can be said that countries with a clear will to improve governance 
and de facto the reduction of corruption should redefine the revision the system of 
incentives and strengthen institutions, to ensure that the necessary controls, etc. This 
has the potential to foster an increased domestic and foreign investment. Such a 
reform procedure would also accelerate economic growth and poverty reduction 
(Rahman et al 2000). 
 Government should also promote social actions in favour of vulnerable population in 
order to accelerate the reduction of the inequality ; since one of the main role of  
Government is to provide or to help in providing social services to its population, 
public resources (internal or external such as debt, aid ...etc.) should be allocate in 
such a way to benefit vulnerable population. 
For instance, after Korean War, according to Lee (2012), Korea invested around 75% 
to 85% of total amount of ODA in Infrastructures and productive sector and 25% to 
15% in social assistance while some developing investing less than 25% in 
infrastructure and productive sector but around 50% in Social, administrative 
infrastructure. This was the key point for Korea fast growth, especially private sector 
growth, and also poverty alleviation. So Developing Countries, in particular Sub-
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Saharan African Countries should allocate their budget to pursue growth target but 
also to improve living standard of vulnerable populations by providing them basic 
services such as rural hospital, education, clean water, electricity,  affordable 
housing...etc. 
 Governments must also implement economic policies that promote consumption that 
is also a source of growth and policies that contribute to reducing budget deficits.  
Additionally, as economic theory indicates, in the short term, fiscal deficit policies 
help to sustain a weak demand (Keynesian multiplier effect) and to increase 
production, but in the long run a high public debt reduces the accumulation of capital 
and decreases the value of production. 
The long-term consequence of financing the budget deficit through debt typically 
results in increasing taxes and it will discourage investments and consumption. It 
should be noted that the rise in taxes also has a direct impact on the decline in income, 
which leads to a fall in purchasing power and, consequently, in the living standards of 
the population. 
 
Building a prosperous nation, a nation where equality prevails vis-a-vis of the law among all 
citizen and other population living in the same Country, sometimes begins with insignificant 
but most important actions. People need to feel the effects of the different public policies that 
authorities implement. The debate on the impact of aid on governance must not stop at the 
mere fact of amelioration of index. it should be evident by trying to built strong institutions, 
respect of law and order, equality of citizens vis-à-vis of the law, respect and protection of 
private initiative, respect for public procurement, etc... 
II. Limitations of the study 
As with most economic studies, there are some shortcomings in our study that deserve to be 
highlighted for further improvement or refinement of results.  
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It should be noted that we used a composite index of governance by combining ICRG and 
CPIA index to consider both economic and institution aspect of governance. Maybe this 
choice can be subject to criticism because of the fact that, this composite index take average 
score of all the components after convert them to the same scale. And also increase the 
number of countries should have been good to elaborate more our results. It was impossible in 
this current study because we ran out  of data for some countries. 
III. Suggestions for further studies 
For further studies, it would be interesting to cinsider a larger number of developing countries 
Also, it be interesting to make a comparative study at the level of large blocks of developing 
countries in Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America. This would make it 
possible to analyze the different reforms implemented in countries with good governance 
successes in order to consider the framework within which these reforms would be applicable 
to other developing countries. We can also look at the analysis of aid impact on governance 
depending on the donor.  
Similarly, it would be feasible to consider the sectoral implications of policies to combat bad 
governance (for example, the fight against corruption, the establishment of strong institutions, 
the strengthening of controls, etc.), accelerate economic growth and poverty alleviation.  
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Annexes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
         within                .0000329  -.0000576   .0005148       T =      10
         between               .0000157          0   .0000666       n =      45
Aid_Te~2 overall    9.00e-06   .0000364          0   .0005683       N =     450
                                                               
         within                4814.916  -10040.12   94767.71       T =      10
         between               1684.021          0   10612.11       n =      45
Aid_P~g2 overall    569.4084   5095.341          0   104810.4       N =     450
                                                               
         within                170.7942  -1094.094   2758.459       T =      10
         between               179.8629          0   1197.627       n =      45
Aid_P~j2 overall    66.94214   246.7243          0   3889.144       N =     450
                                                               
         within                .2234331   6.890715   8.537716       T =      10
         between               1.777102     4.2958    10.6169       n =      32
Conflict overall    7.645816   1.766045          4     10.667       N =     320
                                                               
         within                .1136022   -.322507    .726693       T =      10
         between               .1576932          0      .5823       n =      43
Pol_co~t overall     .259793    .193005          0       .709       N =     430
                                                               
         within                .4031474       3.11       7.16       T =      10
         between               1.611063          1          7       n =      45
Press_F  overall        4.31      1.645          1          7       N =     450
                                                               
         within                4.736454   52.69885   87.06086   T-bar =  6.5641
         between               15.70036    38.9245    98.5765       n =      39
Enr_Prim overall    74.92286   16.38053     35.094     99.214       N =     256
                                                               
         within                 14.9688  -13.44008   195.7999   T-bar = 9.36364
         between                32.4599    32.7048    201.962       n =      44
Trade    overall    76.12992   35.48296     19.101    321.632       N =     412
                                                               
         within                4.919115  -17.85126   56.03074   T-bar = 9.73333
         between               6.181624     -.4586    34.4151       n =      45
FDI      overall    5.499838   7.901398     -5.978     84.946       N =     438
                                                               
         within                4.071083  -31.35816   19.96784       T =      10
         between               2.135057      -.726     10.473       n =      45
GDP_gr~h overall    4.615844   4.587027      -36.7      22.59       N =     450
                                                               
         within                18.37142  -33.15709     291.88       T =      10
         between               11.48079          0   46.24035       n =      45
Aid_Prog overall    10.18676   21.60267          0   323.7444       N =     450
                                                               
        within                .0020883  -.0047674   .0213806       T =      10
         between               .0014485          0    .006378       n =      45
Aid_Tech overall    .0016106   .0025332          0     .02384       N =     450
                                                               
         within                3.796585  -18.98624   37.32776       T =      10
         between               5.125984          0    30.2187       n =      45
Aid_Proj overall    5.183464   6.337436          0     62.363       N =     450
                                                               
         within                 .122972   2.390648   3.333248       T =      10
         between               .6064763      .6552     4.0323       n =      42
Gov      overall    2.863348    .612401       .625      4.211       N =     420
                                                                              
Variable                Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max      Observations
Table  5 : Data Summary 
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Table  6 : Correlation table 
 
Source : Our calculation in Stata 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : Our calculation in Stata  
              
                 0.0000   0.7113   0.3703   0.1067   0.4238   0.0914   0.0031
    Conflict     0.4541   0.0208   0.0502   0.0903   0.0449   0.0956   0.1682 
              
                 0.0000   0.0005   0.2337   0.1963   0.0016   0.0371   0.0000
   Pol_const     0.2375   0.1675   0.0575   0.0624   0.1521  -0.1020  -0.2179 
              
                 0.0000   0.2111   0.3825   0.0000   0.0403   0.0512   0.0190
     Press_F    -0.6563  -0.0591  -0.0413  -0.2931  -0.0967  -0.0932  -0.1155 
              
                 0.0000   0.0328   0.3562   0.0632   0.0528   0.0008   0.4638
    Enr_Prim     0.5835  -0.1335  -0.0579   0.1163   0.1212  -0.2105  -0.0488 
              
                 0.0656   0.0666   0.5695   0.0618   0.0456   0.0000
       Trade    -0.0943   0.0905   0.0281   0.0921   0.0986   0.5222   1.0000 
              
                 0.2822   0.0000   0.0000   0.2199   0.2456
         FDI     0.0534   0.4417   0.2677   0.0587   0.0556   1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.9558   0.8102   0.8359
  GDP_growth     0.2330   0.0026   0.0114   0.0098   1.0000 
              
                 0.0000   0.0045   0.0169
    Aid_Prog     0.2692   0.1335   0.1125   1.0000 
              
                 0.0005   0.0000
    Aid_Tech     0.1685   0.6143   1.0000 
              
                 0.0000
    Aid_Proj     0.2135   1.0000 
              
              
         Gov     1.0000 
                                                                             
                    Gov Aid_Proj Aid_Tech Aid_Prog GDP_gr~h      FDI    Trade
   H0: no autocorrelation 
                           
      4    1.1791  0.2384  
      3   -1.3765  0.1687  
      2    1.1422  0.2534  
      1   -2.3645  0.0181  
                           
   Order    z     Prob > z 
                           
Arellano-Bond test for zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errorsTabl   7 : Arrelano-Bond for zero autocorrelati n in first-differenced errors 
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